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Abstract 
One consequence of the liberalization of certain services in the European Union was that a number of 
formerly inward-looking incumbents in telecommunications and electricity rapidly transformed 
themselves into some of the world’s leading Multinationals. However, the precise relationship 
between liberalization and incumbent internationalization is contested. This article tests three 
persuasive arguments derived from the political economy literature on this relationship. The first 
claims that those incumbents most exposed to domestic liberalization would internationalise most. The 
second asserts the opposite: incumbents operating where liberalization was restricted could exploit 
monopolistic rents to finance their aggressive internationalisation. The third argument claims that a 
diversity of paths will be adopted by countries and incumbents vis-à-vis liberalization and 
internationalization. Using correlation and cluster analysis of the sample of all major EU telecoms and 
electricity incumbent Multinationals evidence is found in favour of the third hypothesis. 
Internationalization as a response to liberalization took diverse forms in terms of timing and extent and 
this is best explained using a country, sector and firm logic. 
Keywords 
Electricity, European Union, internationalization, liberalization, telecommunications, political 
economy 
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1. Introduction  
From the 1980s, the European Commission (EC) started to embark seriously on forging market 
integration in the network industries, particularly in telecommunications and electricity, even 
though it had long enjoyed significant legal competence in the field.1 This new, liberalized 
policy environment which gradually extended over these two sectors substantially changed the 
business options available to incumbents. In particular, liberalization ‘enabled’ these previously 
inward-looking domestic incumbents to contemplate, and pursue, expansion abroad. As a 
consequence of the new policy environment, dozens of incumbents – previously perceived by 
some politicians as inefficient ‘lame ducks’ fit only for privatization during the new economic 
policy emerging from the 1980s (Crafts 1991) – rapidly transformed into highly respected, 
world class Multinational Corporations. Their emergence perhaps provided evidence at last of a 
new dawn of European ‘international champions’, this time not in the traditional industrial 
sectors (Hayward 1995), but in the network industries since, though business reached many 
corners of the globe, the overwhelming bulk of investment was in other EU countries (Clifton, 
Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2007). The policies which underlined their emergence could be 
understood as a response to a concern that European business, including network industries, had 
to adapt to new technological and competitive challenges from the United States, Japan and 
beyond. Market integration in the network industries, it was anticipated, would result in a 
smaller number of more competitive firms better able to confront global challenges. From the 
1990s, a significant number of these incumbents internationalized and now figure not only as 
some of Europe’s but also the world’s largest Multinationals. EDF, Telefónica, E.ON, Deutsche 
Telekom, France Télécom and RWE ranked in the world’s top 25 non-financial Multinationals 
in 2006 (UNCTAD 2008). Fifteen years earlier, none of these firms figured in the top 100 
ranking. Given this development, it would appear that European policy-makers met with some 
success. 
Now, liberalization was a ‘prerequisite’ of incumbent internationalization, because it reduced 
or removed previous restrictions on investment and ownership across borders. 
Internationalization would not have been prioritised or even permitted when nationalized 
incumbents were domestic monopoly public service suppliers. However, the precise 
relationship between incumbents’ internationalization and liberalization is highly contested. 
Considerable tension has been generated around the perception that some incumbents embark 
on aggressive internationalization strategies in other countries which are relatively more 
exposed to liberalization - even daring to take over ‘their’ national ‘jewel in the crown’ - whilst 
the ‘aggressors’’ home governments delay or restrict liberalization in that sector. While this 
perception could generate disquiet in any industry, it is particularly alive in energy and 
communications, which have long been considered of national strategic, economic and social 
importance. Indeed, far from their strategic role becoming obsolete in the twenty-first century, 
new modes of terrorism have used network industries to organise (communications) and deliver 
(transportation and postal services) terror. For market integration to be successful, it is essential 
that a level-playing field is created and that it is perceived that all players stick to the rules of 
the game. To this end, common liberalization deadlines are set, and the EC uses various 
disciplinary instruments to ‘punish’ non-compliers. The problem of ‘asymmetric behaviour’ has 
been partially addressed in the drafting of the new electricity directive (EC 2009) through the 
so-called ´Gazprom clause’ which stipulates prospective acquisitions by vertically integrated 
firms can be blocked if the target incumbent has unbundled. In practice, liberalization as a 
process is rarely implemented identically in different settings: the way that policy is understood, 
and the speed and depth of its implementation, invariably differ. Political economists ascribe the 
                                                     
1 Services of General Economic Interest figured in the Treaty of Rome as exceptions to competition policy where 
this threatened general interest provision. See Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes (2005). 
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different ways in which a policy such as liberalization is implemented on the ground to the 
various and multiple pressures States receive from businesses, trade unions, NGOs, as well as 
the extent to which the State can respond (Smith 2001; Thatcher 2001; Henisz and Zelner 
2006). Purposeful delay - or the perception of purposeful delay – could bring market integration 
to a stand-still (‘why should we open up, with all the political headaches it involves, if they 
aren’t?’).2 Thus, the question of States’ and firms’ responses to liberalization cuts to the heart of 
the political economy of the integration process.  
There are several persuasive arguments in the political economy literature on the relationship 
between internationalization and liberalization. Three main approaches will be tested here. The 
first argument underlines the logic of EC policy in this field: sectoral liberalization leads to the 
erosion of the incumbents’ market share, exposing managers to the ‘cold winds’ of international 
competition. Fearful of being left behind in the ‘race’ to internationalization - investment 
opportunities are limited in these sectors - managers are pressurised to exploit firm economies 
of scale and know-how in new or more lucrative markets abroad. So, faster, deeper 
liberalization at home is associated with greater incumbent internationalization. The second 
argument is less optimistic: incumbent managers, faced by the challenges presented by 
liberalization, will lobby government to restrict or delay liberalization at home whilst, 
simultaneously, exploit opportunities opened up by relatively earlier liberalizing countries 
abroad. High-risk business abroad is supported by ‘softer touch’ liberalization, so greater 
incumbent internationalization is associated with slower and partial liberalization. The third 
argument is more influenced by comparative political economy literature. Liberalization is met 
by rational behaviour of States and firms but, because institutions matter, the processes of 
liberalization will differ. Internationalization, made possible by liberalization, will be pursued 
via different strategies, according to institutional circumstances so, national and sectoral 
responses to liberalization will result in various internationalization responses, explained by 
institutional difference; even if different paths are taken towards a similar end point.  
Building on a body of scholarship on telecommunications and electricity reform (Börsch 
2004, Eising 2002, Haar and Jones 2008, Héritier 2002, Murillo 2009, Thatcher 2001, 2007, 
Van Kranenburg and Hagedoorn 2008) this article analyses the role of liberalization policy in 
explaining incumbent internationalization outcomes in telecommunications and electricity in the 
EU. Correlation and cluster analysis methodology is deployed to analyse all major telecoms 
(12) and electricity (17) Multinationals in the EU plus Norway.3 Analysis of these two sectors is 
justified because: of their role in economic growth; they provide critical networks for the 
movement of knowledge and energy required by the Single Market; they still constitute 
important instruments of the State; and, finally, they constituted key sectors in the privatization 
and liberalization ‘wave’ during the 1990s. After multiple rounds of liberalization, it appears 
much work is left to be accomplished in telecommunications and, particularly, electricity, 
before the Single Market could be understood to be nearing completion (Ilzkovitz et al., 2008). 
In July 2009, the EC ruled E.ON and Gaz de France-Suez had participated in ‘market sharing’, 
fining them 553 million each. Previously, in 2007, Telefónica was forced to pay 152 million 
euros when the EC ruled it had set unfair prices. There are, of course, many other issues that do 
not end up in highly publicised sanctions. 
Deeper insight into the role played by liberalization policy in the internationalization of 
incumbents can shed new light on the political economy of market integration. It is found here 
that no causal relationship exists between incumbent internationalization and liberalization. 
Liberalization and internationalization changed the opportunity sets available for EU 
incumbents and their governments, but ‘policy space’ matters. Policy space is a fast-moving 
zone where States and firms ‘embrace’, ‘baulk’ or ‘limp forward’. Some of the larger players 
                                                     
2 This tension was expressed during interviews by the authors with national regulators during July 2008. 
3 Single market rules apply to Norway as a member of the European Economic Area. See Bartle (2006). 
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moved aggressively to ‘swallow up’ smaller or less-convinced market players, in a West-East 
and North-South direction. Diversity is encountered, at the country, sectoral and, particularly, 
firm level. Decisions taken inside policy space can have long-lasting consequences on the ways 
in which the economy is structured.  
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents the three main 
arguments on the relationship between incumbent internationalization and liberalization and 
derives hypotheses for competitive testing. The third section operationalizes the hypotheses and 
synthesizes the research design. The fourth section provides data on the major EU telecoms and 
electricity incumbents including internationalization. The fifth part contains the analysis divided 
into two sub-sections, telecommunications and electricity. Conclusions follow. 
2. Three Hypotheses on the Role of Liberalization on Incumbent 
Internationalization 
There is a vast literature in the social sciences on why firms internationalize. It is a daunting 
task to summarise this literature; here, three main points will be made about the state-of-the-art 
literature in order to contextualise the more specific political economy literature which deals 
with the role of policy on internationalization. It is first important to remember that most 
research on why firms went abroad focused on the manufacturing, oil and financial sectors, 
reflecting the profile of most twentieth-century Multinationals. Logically, much less attention 
has been paid to why firms in network industries go abroad, so their recent internationalization 
is presenting new research challenges (UNCTAD 2008, Jakopin 2008). Secondly, the reasons 
why a firm goes abroad are complex and interwoven, and cannot usually be reduced to a single 
factor. Theories or paradigms developed to explain firm internationalization take in multiple 
variables. Despite differences across schools of thought on international business, one 
particularly influential perspective was developed by John Dunning (1989). Briefly, the ‘OLI’ 
paradigm locates reasons for internationalization in ‘O’ (firm-specific advantages), ‘L’ (country 
specific advantages) and ‘I’ (internalization). Thirdly, scholars are increasingly recognising the 
role of policy and other institutional factors as variables in the internationalization decision, 
after having been rather neglected (Dunning 2009; Spar 2001). Policy considerations would fit 
broadly into ‘L’, since differences in the timing, extent and quality of policies such as 
liberalization implemented in the home and host country constitute part of the business 
environment in which firms operate. Policy is arguably an even more important factor 
influencing internationalization in the so-called ‘heavily regulated’ network industries. 
Telecoms and electricity incumbents did not have international presence to speak of at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and regulatory change, including liberalization, ‘enabled’ this 
internationalization to occur. Attention is now turned to how the relationship between 
liberalization policy and incumbent internationalization is conceptualised in different strands of 
political economy literature in order to derive the hypotheses. 
The first two hypotheses are based on political economy arguments. The first argument 
underlies the logic of the Single Market project, as detectable in thousands of EC policy 
documents.4 It is also the view expressed by network industry managers in a world-wide survey 
on internationalization drivers (UNCTAD 2008) as well as other academic accounts (Stienstra et 
al., 2004). Liberalization at the sectoral level forces incumbents to react and readjust. They 
increasingly notice how their monopolistic markets are being challenged by new entrants, 
resulting in a decline of their business. They also fear that a failure to liberalize domestically 
will compromise any potential outward expansion, due to reciprocity demands, meaning delay 
could prevent them from entering the internationalization ‘race’. Firms that embrace 
                                                     
4 Neelie Kroes (2005), Commissioner for Competition explained: ‘Companies that face strong competition at home 
are more likely to become successful on a global scale’. 
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liberalization will be freer to seek out better, more profitable business abroad, exploiting their 
economies of scale. Macro policy reform has a direct impact on firm behaviour, therefore, 
which is assumed to be rational, uniform and profit-seeking. This perspective is ‘generalistic’ 
since attention is focused on the transformative power of policy and anticipates a common 
response from firms. Little attention is paid to institutional or firm-based differences. It is also 
‘optimistic’, since it anticipates liberalization will have a uniform, lineal path, from design to 
outcome. If firms, States or both attempt to oppose liberalization, supervisory and disciplinary 
instruments can be used to ensure compliance by the EC. This narrative represents the ‘hope’ of 
policy-makers: competitive markets will drive down prices thus providing consumers with 
better services at lower cost. Thus, hypothesis 1 claims that the greater a firm is exposed to 
earlier and deeper liberalization, the more that firm will respond to increased pressure on its 
domestic market by increasingly going abroad in search of markets.  
Another reading from political economy predicts a different outcome from which the second 
hypothesis is derived (Bonardi 2004; Chari and Gupta 2008, Haar and Jones 2008, Sarkar et al. 
1999). In common with the first approach, liberalization is understood as being an important 
factor when explaining internationalization patterns of network industries; firms and States are 
understood to behave rationally and uniformly; institutional aspects are downplayed. The 
crucial difference is in the direction of the linkage between internationalization and 
liberalization. In a battle for survival, as liberalization quickens and deepens, firms, sometimes 
supported by their States, will seek to avoid or restrict liberalization at home. ‘National 
champion’ policies are a case in point: governments may opt to ‘cushion’ national players from 
the onset of a potentially damaging policy in order to shore up valued political support. Highly 
publicised examples include Italian Prime Minister Berlusconi’s stated preference to keep 
Telecom Italia in ‘Italian hands’ and France’s former Prime Minister Dominque de Villepin’s 
‘patriotisme economique’ pledge to protect eleven ‘strategic’ industries – including casinos – 
from foreign takeover.5 States can deliberately implement liberalization incorrectly, partially or 
slowly, giving ‘breathing time’ to domestic players to readjust and exploit other markets which 
opt to open up earlier. State protection of industry may be even more likely to emerge in 
industries such as networks, associated historically with the nation in economic, political, 
strategic and social terms. Protection provides a firm with ‘safe’ financial resources derived 
from monopoly rents which can be used to undertake risky international operations. Thus, 
hypothesis 2 argues that greater firm internationalization is associated with relatively slower 
and limited implementation of liberalization.  
The third hypothesis is influenced by the comparative political economy and institutionalist 
literature (Hall and Soskice 2001) which focuses on reform in these sectors (Börsch 2004, Levi-
Faur 2006, Murillo 2009, Thatcher and Héritier 2002). The most nuanced of these accounts is 
Thatcher (2007). This adopts a policy analysis approach and argues different paths to reform, 
explained by institutional differences, may eventually lead to relatively similar outcomes. In 
common with the other two perspectives, it is assumed that liberalization is important and firms 
and States act rationally. Institutional and geopolitical differences, however, matter, and 
significantly shape processes and outcomes, hence countries and sectors may embark on 
different paths towards a similar reform direction. So, hypothesis 3 claims that governments and 
firms responded in various rational ways to liberalization, incumbent internationalization being 
one of those responses, and these differences of timing and extent can be explained by 
institutional differences even if some convergence is finally attained.  
Testing these three hypotheses is the central aim of this article. However, there are two 
secondary questions that require brief attention: ownership and firm size. Liberalization has 
often been confused with privatization. These two policies are conceptually quite different, 
since liberalization entails introducing competition, whilst privatization means more private 
                                                     
5 Times 18 April 2007  
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ownership. Whilst the EC has competence in liberalization policy, it is up to national 
governments to implement privatization (Clifton, Comín and Díaz-Fuentes 2006). Did 
privatization influence internationalization? It could be argued that more privatization makes a 
company more visible to its stock-holders, forcing it to be efficient and maximise profits, whilst 
cutting its political ties make the firm more agile to move (Megginson and Netter 2001). Thus, 
the greater a firm is privatised, the more likely that firm is to respond to increased pressure on 
its domestic market by seeking out more profitable markets abroad (hypothesis 4). In many 
ways, hypothesis 4 is the corollary of hypothesis 1, in that greater liberalization and deeper 
privatization form part of the reform of the network industries so are seen as going hand in 
hand. The opposite of this argument is the corollary to hypothesis 2. Mergers and Acquisitions 
are often once-off, risky and politically complex operations: board-room politics often becomes 
transformed into ‘high politics’ when potential gains are significant. Incumbents with 
significant political involvement may be at an advantage in that they could have access to more 
information as well as to politicians who could ‘smooth the way’ for the operation to take place. 
Following this logic, firms with significant public ownership may be more likely to 
internationalize more strongly, thanks to interference from a political ‘visible’ hand. Thus, less 
privatization should be correlated to more internationalization (hypothesis 5). Finally, firm size 
could be an important factor enabling firm internationalization. For instance, there may be a 
minimum size that firms need to reach before internationalization becomes possible. Hence, 
firm size is a control variable throughout the analysis.  
3. Research Design 
Four hypotheses predict a lineal and continuous relationship between internationalization and 
liberalization policy (1 and 2), and internationalization and privatization (4 and 5), albeit in 
different directions. If hypothesis 1 is correct, we would expect to find correlations between 
higher levels of firm internationalization with deeper and faster implementation of 
liberalization, in its multiple forms. Hypothesis 2 is correct if restricted and more sluggish 
liberalization implementation was correlated with greater incumbent internationalization. As 
regards internationalization and ownership, hypothesis 4 predicts that more privatization will be 
correlated with greater internationalization, and hypothesis 5, less privatization would be 
correlated with greater internationalization. Incumbent size is controlled for throughout. 
Correlational analysis measures the strength of the associations between the independent and 
dependent variables, thus is appropriate to test these hypotheses. Hypothesis 3, in contrast, 
predicts that there is no fixed relationship between the variables; rather, there will be multiple 
paths in terms of the timing and extent towards incumbent internationalization and 
liberalization, which can be explained by institutional differences. Cluster analysis is ideal for 
testing this, since patterns of incumbent behaviour are made visible. 
4. A ‘Snapshot’ of Recent Internationalization of EU Telecoms and Electricity 
Incumbents 
Before proceeding to competitively test the hypotheses on the relationship between incumbent 
internationalization and liberalization, a sketch of the internationalization of major EU telecoms 
and electricity incumbents is provided. Tables 1 and 2 respectively show the major telecoms and 
electricity Multinationals between 1999 and 2006, ranked by revenue in 2006. The ‘Western 
bias’ of the integration process can be seen since only major Western European Multinationals 
emerged, whilst Eastern Member States were generally recipients of this process. Data is 
provided on the timing and extent of internationalization, liberalization and ownership, revenue 
and employees. Definitions and measurements of internationalization, liberalization and 
privatization require explanation. International activity by firms takes two main forms: global 
alliances or the physical extension of the firms’ sales, assets and/or employees abroad. It is this 
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second activity that has been of greater importance in telecommunications and electricity, so it 
is this ‘physical’ internationalization that is considered here. Internationalization is quantified as 
foreign revenues as a percentage of overall revenues.6 Data on foreign operating revenues is 
derived from annual company reports and Amadeus (2009). Liberalization is complex to 
quantify. The OECD (2009) is perhaps the most comprehensive quantitative database of 
regulation and is used here. OECD methodology constructs different sets of indicators for 
liberalization in telecommunications and electricity (Conway and Nicoletti 2006). For 
telecommunications, liberalization is measured in two ways. Firstly, an indicator is constructed 
for ‘Entry Regulation’, meaning to what extent legal systems allow for new entrants, 0 being 
they do not, and 1 being completely.7 The second indicator, ‘Market Structure’, indicates what 
market share new entrants enjoy, as a means of gauging the extent to which liberalization leads 
to actual competition. Zero means none and 1 means the total market. For electricity, ‘Entry 
Regulation’ measures the terms and conditions for third party access, the extent to which 
consumers can chose supplier, and the existence of a liberalized wholesale market for power. 
Zero means none, 1 means this is fully liberalized. The second electricity liberalization indicator 
is ‘Vertical Integration’, or the extent to which the industry has been unbundled, 1 meaning the 
industry is integrated, 0 meaning it is fully unbundled (Conway and Nicoletti 2006). Indicators 
for ownership are also included: 0 means full public ownership; 1 means total private 
ownership.  
                                                     
6 Methodology deployed by the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) constructs a 
composite proxy of internationalization combining data on sales, employees and assets abroad. When this 
information is not available, however, data on sales, employment or assets abroad only is used. To avoid possible 
bias that the UNCTAD approach could cause, we use here ‘only’ data on sales abroad. 
7 This is a composite indicator including mobile, trunk and international long distance telecommunications 
services. 
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Table 1: EU Telecoms Multinationals: Size, Internationalisation and Regulatory Reform Indicators 1999, 2003 and 2006 
    Revenues (000 euros) Employees (000) Internationalisation Entry Regulation Market structure Privatization 
Company Country 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 
Deutsche Telekom Germany 
 35 
325 
 62 
739 
 77 
069 
 203 
268 
 251 
263 
 248 
480 8 38 47 100 100 100 51 64 69 41 57 63 
Telefónica Spain 
 24 
458 
 31 
910 
 66 
459 
 146 
619 
 221 
657 
 232 
996 58 38 62 100 100 100 30 39 44 100 100 100 
France Telecom France 
 29 
014 
 51 
821 
 64 
952 
 174 
282 
 148 
288 
 191 
036 13 41 47 100 100 100 39 56 60 39 41 57 
Telecom Italia Italy 
 29 
425 
 35 
051 
 40 
052 
 122 
682 
 93 
187 
 83 
209 6 20 26 100 100 100 30 49 54 96 100 100 
BT UK 
 35 
438 
 30 
359 
 35 
937 
 136 
800 
 99 
900 
 106 
204 7 7 15 100 100 100 63 77 72 100 100 100 
KPN Telecom Netherlands  9 729 
 14 
502 
 15 
126 
 38 
550 
 31 
267 
 26 
287 9 20 29 100 100 100 35 64 52 56 81 92 
Telenor Norway  4 291  7 503 
 14 
201 
 23 
470 
 26 
694 
 35 
600 17 41 64 100 100 100 23 47 49 11 38 46 
TeliaSonera Sweden  8 149 
 10 
108 
 12 
342 
 40 
155 
 19 
450 
 28 
528 10 49 60 100 100 100 36 56 62 15 54 51 
TDC Denmark  5 765  7 945  8 390 
 17 
464 
 24 
872 
 19 
010 42 53 48 100 100 100 56 64 61 100 100 100 
Portugal Telecom Portugal  3 429  6 490  8 235 
 16 
188 
 19 
207 
 32 
058 9 24 37 33 100 100 21 34 48 88 94 93 
OTE Greece  3 622  5 522  7 768 
 21 
588 
 17 
169 
 17 
782 0 19 26 33 100 100 19 50 53 42 66 72 
Telekom Austria Austria  3 966  4 460  5 472 
 19 
347 
 13 
890 
 15 
428 0 11 32 100 100 100 28 66 67 13 53 75 
                                        
Mean   16,051 22,367 29,667 80,034 80,570 86,385 14,9 30,1 41,1 88,9 100 100 35,9 55,5 57,6 58,2 73,6 79,0 
Standard Deviation   13,387 19,796 26,493 70,804 84,511 88,366 17,4 15,1 16,0 26,0 0 0 14,0 12,3 8,9 36,6 24,7 20,9 
                                        
Sources: Elaborated by the authors based on Amadeus (2009), Company Annual Reports (various years) and OECD (2009).               
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Attention is first turned to the telecoms Multinationals. Pressures to reform telecommunications 
due to technological change, international developments and ideological beliefs have been 
documented elsewhere (OECD 2007). In 2006, there were five huge and eight medium-sized 
EU Multinationals. Interestingly, the ranking of the ‘giants’ changed between 1999 and 2006. In 
1999, BT ranked top, just ahead of Deutsche Telekom. But, by 2006, BT’s revenue had 
stagnated, and was reduced to fifth position, having grown much less than the other ‘giants’, 
whilst the German incumbent’s revenue more than doubled, leading the pack. Telefónica ranked 
fifth in 1999, but leapt to second place in 2006, after growing 80% during this period. It can be 
seen that much of the growth of the incumbents was fuelled by internationalization. The average 
extent of incumbent internationalization in 1999 was nearly 15%, increasing to 41% in 2006. 
Internationalization of the incumbents was uneven both as regards timing and extent. Both 
smaller and larger incumbents were able to internationalise. In 1999, internationalization ‘stars’ 
included Telefónica (58%) and TDC (42%); by 2006, sales abroad exceeded those at home for 
Telenor (64%), Telefónica (62%) and TeliaSonera (60%). BT was by far the least international 
of the Multinationals by 2006. As regards liberalization, ‘Entry Regulation’ shows that 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK were ‘first movers’ during the 1990s, indeed, their liberalization 
preceded implementation of the EC liberalization directives. The importance of EC directives as 
regards timing, however, can be seen as all other countries reached full ‘Entry Regulation’ by 
the 1999 deadline, except those with official extensions: Greece, Portugal and Ireland. The UK 
was consistently the most open market for new entrants (‘Market Structure’). Between 1999 and 
2003, average access to market share for new entrants increased from 35% to 56%; but this only 
grew another 2% in the next three years. In 2006, incumbents still enjoyed around 43% of 
market share, though this was uneven. Telefónica enjoyed the highest market share (66%), 
whereas BT only had 28%. Of the ‘big five’, Spain was the least open between 1999 and 2006. 
As ‘first-mover’, Telefónica - enjoying monopoly status and having enjoyed significant private 
ownership from the 1970s since nationalization was never completed – was the 
internationalization pioneer, starting very early on, to take advantage of the opening up of Latin 
American telecoms markets as part of the so-called ‘Washington Consensus’. Privatization was 
completed earlier on in BT, TDC and Telefónica, followed by Telecom Italia. Though 
telecommunications privatization was widespread across the EU in this period, public 
ownership remained at 24% on average in 2006, being higher in Deutsche Telekom, France 
Télécom, Telenor, TeliaSonera, OTE and Telekom Austria. 
We now turn to the EU’s 17 major electricity Multinationals ranked by revenue in 2006 
(Table 2). Technological, economic and ideological factors influencing reform and EU 
responses have been documented elsewhere (Domanico 2007). Again, all incumbent 
Multinationals are from Western Europe. Unlike telecoms, where there is one major national 
incumbent, in electricity, there may be several, due to the organization of the sector as regional 
monopolies or else as a result of unbundling, as in the case of National Grid. This fact should 
not cause sample bias because firms in the same policy environment may – indeed do - behave 
differently. Thomas (2003) predicted that the outcome of the Single Market in electricity would 
be a ‘seven sisters’ oligopoly. Along similar lines but for the case of France, Bauby and Varone 
(2007) argued that one of the paradoxes of European market integration was the successful 
‘engineering’ of national energy giants, EDF and the multi-utility GDF-Suez. By 2006, the EU 
only had five energy giants left: E.ON, RWE, EDF, GDF-Suez8 and ENEL. A pessimistic 
‘seven sisters’ oligopoly now seems over-optimistic. Examining internationalization patterns, 
E.ON recalls Telefónica’s behaviour in that it went international very early on (48% of sales 
were earned abroad in 1999) whilst enjoying monopoly conditions at home. Internationalization 
of incumbents was, on average, 11% in 1999, and 39% by 2006, a strikingly similar outcome to 
the extent of internationalization in telecoms incumbents over the same period. International 
patterns are uneven but it is notable how some of the fastest growing incumbents during this 
period were the medium-sized firms, namely Vattenfall, EnBW, National Grid and EDP.  
                                                     
8 Suez took over Electrabel in 2003 and then merged with GDF in 2007. Hollinger (2009).  
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Table 2: EU Electricity Multinationals: Size, Internationalisation and Regulatory Reform Indicators 1999, 2003 and 2006 
    Revenues (000 euros) Employees (000) Internationalization Entry Regulation Vertical Integration Privatization 
Company Country 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 
E.On Germany  52,016 47,616 72,408 132,930 64,969 80,453 48 41 47 50 83 100 M M M 100 100 100 
EDF France  32,057 44,919 60,493 135,448 163,694 156,524 18 29 47 28 94 94 I I M 0 0 25 
RWE Germany  45,671 47,470 43,076 155,697 139,535 65,910 23 44 48 50 83 100 M M M 0 0 25 
Enel ++ Italy  20,933 30,345 38,513 78,511 64,770 60,085 0 5 14 33 61 94 I U U 0 25 50 
Endesa ++ Spain  13,495 16,644 20,774 34,930 26,600 26,948 31 39 48 94 100 100 M U U 75 75 75 
Electrabel Belgium  5,859 10,988 14,051 16,439 17,360 16,585 n.a. 28 40 17 61 61 I M M 75 75 75 
Iberdrola * Spain  7,504 10,903 11,253 12,653 13,042 16,969 0 12 18 94 100 100 M U U 75 75 75 
Scottish Power* UK  6,247 7,626 8,037 15,932 15,490 9,953 0 59 47 100 100 100 U U U 100 100 100 
Vattenfall Sweden  3,268 12,538 16,153 7,991 35,296 32,308 6 64 60 100 100 100 M M M 0 0 0 
EnBW Germany  4,470 11,300 13,755 12,581 34,719 20,265 9 12 7 50 83 100 M M M 0 0 25 
National Grid UK  2,299 13,592 13,603 3,628 28,940 20,529 0 46 46 100 100 100 U U U 100 100 100 
Unión Fenosa Spain  3,270 5,864 6,057 10,785 21,269 17,765 9 34 34 94 100 100 M U U 75 75 75 
EDP Portugal  3,954 8,030 9,390 13,992 17,388 13,333 2 19 39 28 100 100 M M M 50 50 50 
Essent Netherland 5,164 8,112 6,663 9,852 12,206 10,421 0 18 23 94 100 100 M M U 0 0 0 
Dong Energy  Denmark  915 2,489 4,780 572 1,125 2,944 0 30 33 94 100 100 I U U 25 25 25 
Fortum Finland 2,448 4,812 4,571 17,461 13,343 8,910 32 64 73 100 100 100 M M M 50 50 50 
EVN Austria 1,116 1,340 2,233 2,221 2,608 9,535 0 9 46 33 100 100 I M U 25 25 25 
Mean   12,393 16,740 20,342 38,919 39,550 33,496 11,1 32,5 39,4 68,3 92,2 97,1       44,1 45,6 51,5 
Standard Deviation 15,920 15,683 20,737 52,160 46,021 38,647 15,0 18,9 16,7 32,4 13,3 9,4       40,0 38,8 33,6 
                                        
Sources: Elaborated by the authors based on Amadeus (2009), Company Annual Reports (various years) and OECD (2009).               
U=Unbundled, M=Mixed, I=Integrated.                                   
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Comparison of the data on progress towards liberalization for telecoms and electricity shows how, 
whilst in telecoms, Entry Regulation was virtually in place by 1999, progress was slower in electricity. 
One convincing reason for the slowness of transposition of electricity vis-à-vis telecoms reform has 
been provided by the argument that the first was an intergovernmental process whilst the second was 
supranational (Levi-Faur 1999). So, if by 1999, nearly all countries had liberalized 
telecommunications, there were a number of laggards in electricity. As in telecoms, the timing and 
extent of liberalization was very uneven. The UK was uniquely early in its pre-emption of EC 
Directives: full liberalization and unbundling were reached as early as 1995. The Nordic countries 
were also early movers to liberalise Entry Regulation, though Denmark was the only one to fully 
unbundle by 2002. These countries had historically traded electricity with each other to balance their 
systems and, in the late 1990s, they established the Nordic Power Exchange for a single electricity 
market for the four countries. After the UK lead, the path to unbundling was uneven; Spain (2002), 
Italy (2003) and the Netherlands (2004) responded to EC Directives. Other countries, particularly 
France, Belgium, Germany and Portugal moved more slowly. As regards ownership, privatization was 
quite slow during the period, increasing on average from 44% to 51% of these incumbents. Here, there 
was huge diversity: in 2006, incumbents from Germany and the UK were fully privatised whilst public 
ownership still dominated in Sweden, the Netherlands, France, Switzerland, Austria and Denmark. 
The privatization of incumbent Multinationals went much further in telecoms than in electricity. 
5. Analysis 
The five hypotheses are now tested using correlation and cluster analysis techniques. Results are 
divided into telecoms and electricity.  
Telecoms 
Correlation between variables using Pearson bivariate correlation, Kendall rank and Spearman rank 
correlation were used to detect the strength of association between internationalization and entry 
regulation, market structure, ownership, size (revenue and employees) for 1999, 2003 and 2006. 
Results are shown in Annex 1. Using Pearson’s correlation, in 1999, there is a negative relationship 
between internationalization and public ownership (privately-owned incumbents were more likely to 
go abroad), though this correlation is not apparent applying Kendall and Spearman correlations. 
However, this correlation did not reappear using Pearson in 2003 or 2006. No other significant 
variables were detected which correlated with internationalization, including the two indicators for 
liberalization. So, over this period, indicators on liberalization, ownership or size do not explain the 
extent of incumbent internationalization. No evidence on hypotheses 1, 2, 4 or 5 is obtained.  
Next, cluster analysis is deployed to search for groups that are found to be similar in one or more 
sets of variables, to test hypothesis 3. All 12 telecoms incumbent Multinationals were considered for 
extent of internationalization, entry regulation and market structure for 1999, 2003 and 2006. Results 
are shown in Table 3. Since all Member States had attained complete entry regulation from 1999, this 
variable is no longer of use and is excluded from the analysis henceforth. 
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Table 3: Cluster Membership* of EU Telecoms Multinationals: Internationalisation and 
liberalisation Market entry 1999, and Market Structure 1999, 2003 and 2006 
Internationalisation 
and Market entry 
Internationalisation 
and Market 
Structure 
 1999 1999 2003 2006 
Deutsche Telekom 3 3 4 4 
Telefónica 4 2 2 2 
France Telecom 3 1 4 4 
Telecom Italia 3 1 1 1 
BT 3 3 3 3 
KPN Telecom 3 1 3 1 
Telenor 3 1 2 2 
TeliaSonera 3 1 4 4 
TDC 4 4 4 4 
Portugal Telecom 1 1 1 1 
OTE 1 1 1 1 
Telekom Austria 3 1 3 4 
Valid cases 12 12 12 12 
Based on Squared Euclidean Distance and Average Distance among groups   
1. Low internationalisation and low liberalisation       
2. High internationalisation and low liberalisation       
3. Low internationalisation and high liberalisation       
4. High internationalisation and high liberalisation        
 
The cluster analysis reveals some interesting patterns. Starting with 1999, there are two sets of 
findings: internationalization and entry regulation, and internationalization and market structure. 
Regarding the former, two incumbents – TDC and Telefónica - set the pace to internationalise, and 
which constitute cluster 4. Both incumbents underwent significant internationalization and were based 
in countries where entry regulation had been liberalised. The vast majority of incumbents, however, 
fell into cluster 3; here, internationalization is rather slow, whilst entry regulation is liberalised. 
Portugal and Greece predictably fall into a fourth category, cluster 1; where incumbent 
internationalization is slow and entry regulation is officially delayed. 
Analysis of internationalization and market structure throws a more nuanced light on these results, 
particularly as regards the strategies of TDC and Telefónica. TDC is left alone in Cluster 4, since 
market share is quite liberalized in Denmark. Telefónica uniquely comprises Cluster 2, having 
embarked on an ambitious internationalization programme whilst enjoying a relatively high share of 
its domestic market. Hence, TDC and Telefónica emerge as opposites: the two most international of 
companies pursued this expansion based on different shares of the domestic market. Again, the vast 
majority of incumbents fell into the same category, cluster 1; here, internationalization is low, as is 
market structure liberalization. Exceptions are BT and Deutsche Telekom (cluster 3), where 
internationalization is quite low but market structure has been highly liberalized. The clusters in 1999 
show clearly that there are no automatic relationships between the variables under study, rather, in 
similar situations incumbents pursued different paths toward internationalization.  
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A number of patterns emerge over the next seven years. Firstly, Telefónica is joined by Telenor in 
cluster 2. As mentioned in section four, Telefónica and Telenor were both internationalization ‘stars’ 
as regards their aggressive pursuit of internationalization. Both did so in a context of slower 
liberalization of market structure. Telenor emulates Telefónica’s strategy from 2003. Secondly, 
ambitious internationalization is now pursued by other incumbents this time in the context of a 
liberalised market structure. TDC’s strategy is adopted by TeliaSonera, France Télécom, Deutsche 
Telekom and, to a lesser extent, Telekom Austria, which comprise cluster 4. There is a third group of 
incumbents (cluster 1) which internationalized more slowly, based in countries where market structure 
was less liberalised: Telecom Italia, KPN, Portugal Telecom and OTE. Finally, BT alone forms cluster 
3, as incumbent internationalization was relatively low and where market structure had been highly 
liberalization. BT’s lower international level was due to the fact that much of its initial international 
activity was sold off after its abandonment during firm re-organization.  
Electricity 
Using the same correlation techniques and periods of time as for telecoms, the extent of incumbent 
electricity Multinationals was analysed, considering entry regulation, vertical integration, ownership, 
revenue and employees. No correlations were detected between incumbent internationalization and 
entry or vertical integration (see Annex). In 1999, there is a significant correlation between incumbent 
size and internationalization, though this is not seen in 2003 and 2006. It appears that larger firms had 
the edge when embarking on internationalization strategies in the earlier period. However, since no 
correlations were found between liberalization and internationalization, no evidence for hypotheses 1, 
2, 4 and 5 was detected.  
Next, cluster analysis is applied in order to detect any patterns in incumbent internationalization, 
considering the same variables and time period as previously. Results are shown in Table 4. The 
relationship between internationalization and entry regulation is first analysed, shown on the left part 
of Table 4. In 1999, the most internationalized of incumbents fell into two clusters. On the one hand 
were those incumbents which internationalized strongly whilst entry regulation was also liberalized, 
Fortum and Endesa, forming cluster 4. E.ON, in contrast, stands out for its aggressive 
internationalization in the context of low entry regulation liberalization. As in telecoms, the leader 
incumbent internationalizers emerged from contexts where liberalization is both less and more 
advanced. E.ON could be compared to Telefónica in its pursuit of ambitious internationalization from 
a relatively closed market. Most incumbents pursued relatively cautious internationalization 
programmes in 1999. There were two similarly-sized clusters of incumbents here: cluster 3 where 
liberalization was more advanced, and cluster 1 where this was delayed. Included in cluster 3 were 
Spanish regional incumbents (Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa) and in cluster 1 were German regional 
incumbents (RWE and EnBW). These Spanish and German incumbents had much lower 
internationalization levels than Endesa and E.ON respectively. This suggests that even a national-
sectoral approach cannot account for the variety of firm strategies adopted. Rather, varieties of 
response are located at the firm level. Finally, most incumbents pursued internationalization slowly; 
only five of seventeen incumbents were pursuing internationalization with great enthusiasm in 1999.  
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Table 4: Cluster Membership of EU Electricity Multinationals: 
Internationalisation, Entry regulation and Vertical Integration 1999, 2003 and 2006 
  
Internationalisation 
and Entry 
regulation     
Internationalisation 
and Vertical 
integration     
  1999 2003 2006 1999 2003 2006 
E.On 2 4 4 1 1 1 
EDF 1 4 4 2 2 1 
RWE 1 4 4 1 1 1 
Enel ++ 1 1 3 2 3 3 
Endesa ++ 4 4 4 1 4 4 
Electrabel** 0 1 2   3 1 
Iberdrola * 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Scottish Power* 3 4 4 3 4 4 
Vattenfall 3 4 4 3 1 1 
EnBW 1 3 3 3 3 2 
National Grid 3 4 4 3 4 4 
Unión Fenosa 3 4 4 3 4 4 
EDP 1 3 4 3 3 1 
Essent 3 3 3 3 3 3 
Dong Energy  3 4 4 2 4 4 
Fortum 4 4 4 1 1 1 
EVN 1 3 4 2 3 4 
Valid cases 16 17 17 16 17 17 
Based on Squared Euclidean Distance and Average Distance among groups     
1. Low internationalisation and low liberalisation   1. High international & high integration 
2. High internationalisation and low liberalisation   2. Low international and high Integration 
3. Low internationalisation and high liberalisation   3. Low international and low integration 
4. High internationalisation and high liberalization   4. High international and low integration 
 
Attention is now turned to the other liberalization indicator, vertical integration, shown on the right-
hand side of Table 4. Cluster 1 comprises incumbents which made over-the-average progress 
unbundling and where internationalization was stronger: Fortum, Endesa, E.ON and RWE.9 As 
mentioned previously and in common with telecoms, the vast majority of electricity incumbents were 
slow to internationalise in 1999. In both telecoms and electricity, only a minority of incumbents were 
already strongly internationalised by 1999. Of the lesser internationalised incumbents, three fell into 
cluster 2, where unbundling is progressing slowly; the bulk (eight) fall into cluster 3, where 
unbundling is being pursued.  
How did these incumbents evolve over the next seven years? Analysis is first turned to 
internationalization and entry regulation. By 2006, there is some convergence in the sense that all 
incumbents bar one, Electrabel, which is discussed below, are in either cluster 3 or 4, both of which 
are characterised by high liberalization. Of these incumbents, cluster 4 is the dominant one, grouping 
12 incumbents that internationalized strongly – following the pattern set by Fortum and Endesa – 
                                                     
9 In the 1999 cluster analysis of internationalization and entry regulation RWE was included in the cluster of lower 
internationalized and lower liberalized firms: however, in the cluster showing internationalization and vertical 
integration, it falls into the group of more highly internationalised firms based in countries which are slower to unbundle. 
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based in home markets where entry regulation is liberalised. The second largest cluster, 3, is composed 
of four incumbents, grouping incumbents which internationalised less though from liberalized 
environments (Enel, Iberdrola, EnBW and Essent). Interestingly, two of these more ‘hesitant’ 
internationalizers, Iberdrola and Enel have, since 2006, completed huge acquisitions. In 2007, 
Iberdrola took over Scottish Power, whilst in 2009, Enel took over Endesa. It seems that the ‘hesitant’ 
internationalizers ‘bided their time’ until they made their move to acquire more internationalised 
incumbents, absorbing all their international business. Chronologically, the UK was the first of the 
three to liberalise entry, followed by Spain with Italy trailing behind. From this perspective, a ‘wait-
and-see’ logic may have proved advantageous: slower liberalisers took advantage of incumbents in 
countries had had liberalised previously. The wave of massive Mergers and Acquisitions reflects the 
fact that the EU electricity market is characterised by monopolistic competition, and that market 
integration is resulting in domination by a small number of huge Multinationals. Belgium’s 
traditionally private Electrabel was the main exception to the rule. Here, a defensive strategy was at 
work. Electrabel pursued an ambitious internationalization programme between 1999 and 2006 as the 
government delayed market opening. Fears about the incumbent’s vulnerability were proved correct 
when immediately, on opening the market, Electrabel was snapped up by Suez, after which both were 
merged with Gaz de France to form one of Europe’s largest multi-utilities (Bauby and Varone 2007).  
As regards internationalization and vertical integration, the most internationalized of electricity 
incumbents are divided up nearly equally into two clusters, since, whilst entry regulation liberalization 
was nearly complete in 2006, progress on unbundling was mixed. First, there was a group of seven 
highly internationalised incumbents based in countries where unbundling was more advanced (cluster 
4). This included National Grid, Scottish Power, Endesa, Unión Fenosa, Dong Energy and EVN. 
These incumbents were able to internationalise as both entry regulation and unbundling were 
implemented. Second, a group of six incumbents (cluster 1) pursued significant internationalisation 
expansion, in a context of liberalised entry but delayed unbundling (E.ON, EDF, RWE, Vattenfall, 
EDP, and Fortum). The main exception was Electrabel, which had delayed both forms of 
liberalization, as previously explained. So, Finland’s Fortum, which in 1999 seemed to be setting the 
pace for internationalization in the context of advanced liberalization, and saw its foreign revenues 
increase over seven years from 32% 73%, did so whilst unbundling remained stagnant. A similar 
observation can be made of the other cluster members. A third cluster, 3, comprises three incumbents 
whose internationalization was somewhat slower in a context of greater progress unbundling. EnBW is 
alone in cluster 2, enjoying higher vertical integration but less internationalization. Here, it can be seen 
how Iberdrola and EnBW, operating in the same policy environment as their other highly 
internationalized Spanish and German peers, were both much slower to internationalise. Again, 
diversity is beyond national and sectoral patterns, it is ultimately located at the firm level.  
6. Conclusions: Explaining Internationalization Patterns in Telecoms and Electricity 
Regulatory reforms defined broadly as liberalization were a prerequisite for the rise of telecoms and 
energy Multinationals. The internationalization of EU incumbents could not have taken place without 
liberalization of entry regulation and would have been difficult without progress on unbundling and 
privatization. However, on the ground, it is highly unlikely that all countries implement liberalization 
in precisely the same way at the same moment. The perception that some countries behave 
asymmetrically, by delaying or restricting liberalization whilst promoting ‘national champions’ to 
takeover other countries’ strategic ‘jewels in the crown’, is a considerable source of tension in the EU. 
A clearer understanding of State and firm response to liberalization helps shed light on the political 
economy of market integration.  
Three main hypotheses on the relationship between internationalization and liberalization were 
established. The first hypothesis predicted that those incumbents most exposed to earlier and deeper 
liberalization would be those which internationalized most. The second argument predicted that 
incumbents would pressurise States to restrict or delay liberalization, so those with secure financial 
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and political resources would be most able to embark on high-risk adventures abroad. Correlation was 
used to test these hypotheses, and it was confirmed that no evidence existed on a direct relationship 
between internationalization and liberalization or ownership. Hypotheses 1 and 2 (and secondary 
hypotheses 4 and 5) were rejected.  
Attention was then turned to hypothesis 3, which, asserting the importance of institutional diversity, 
anticipated that countries and sectors would pursue various routes toward liberalization and 
internationalization, though often moving towards a similar point. Cluster analysis was used to reveal 
a diversity of responses to liberalization and internationalization. In general, this diversity can be 
organised at the country level, with modifications for sectors and, also, for firms. Countries and firms 
can be organised into larger and smaller ones.  
The Single Market led to the emergence of Multinationals in telecommunications and electricity 
from Western Europe; Eastern Europe was a recipient. The large continental countries, particularly 
France and Germany, dominated the battle for precedence in assuring their respective national 
incumbents would dominate European Multinationals in both sectors. Neither were liberalization 
‘pace-setters’ nor were they consistent ‘laggards’: rather, they were ‘middle-of-the-roaders’. France 
was slower than average to liberalize electricity, whilst E.ON’s early internationalization occurred in 
near monopolistic conditions. In telecoms, France moved to liberalise at an average pace; Germany 
was somewhat faster. Spain and Italy took strides to join them: Telefónica emerged as a leading world 
Multinational in near monopoly conditions, though Spain was among the ‘pace-setters’ liberalizing 
electricity. Relatively faster liberalization did not prevent Endesa from emerging as a leading 
European Multinational, though Iberdrola and Unión Fenosa were more hesitant to internationalize. 
Italy was somewhat slower to implement liberalization and its incumbents were slower to go abroad, 
nevertheless, Enel and Telecom Italia occupied positions in the top five by 2006. The most 
international of the EU’s Multinational telecoms and electricity incumbents emerged from the larger 
continental economies: France, Germany, Italy and Spain. Though there were no automatic relations 
between the timing and extent of liberalization and incumbent internationalization, the large part of 
these Multinationals came about more thanks to a slower or middle-of-the-road approach to 
liberalization than a faster one. The UK took a different path: it embraced liberalization 
enthusiastically, acting prior to EC directives in both sectors. Today, UK incumbents do not dominate 
the EU Multinational rankings in these sectors. In telecommunications, BT sacrificed its domination of 
the rankings, de-internationalising in order to prioritise its home market. The UK now presents itself 
as a highly attractive site for investment: Telefónica’s O2 has already overtaken Vodafone in the UK, 
and proposed mergers between Orange and T-Mobile, and France Télécom and Deutsche Telekom 
would put Vodafone further down the UK ranking (Parker 2009). In electricity, Scottish Power was 
taken over by Iberdrola.  
Among the smaller economies, the Nordic countries constituted a close group. In general, these 
countries liberalised earlier, whilst incumbents responded enthusiastically to internationalization 
options, though on a sub-regional basis. In electricity, this was because a trade pooling system existed; 
in telecommunications, the ‘star’ internationaliser, Telenor, earned 23% of foreign revenue from other 
Nordic countries, 12% from Eastern Europe and 30% from beyond Europe. In telecommunications, 
Norway liberalised more slowly than Sweden, Finland and Denmark, and its investments beyond 
Europe were high, hence Telenor’s comparison with Telefónica. Defensive patterns dominated 
behaviour of many of the other smaller economies. In Greece, the Netherlands and Portugal, 
liberalization was implemented relatively slowly, and incumbents internationalised though quite 
cautiously. In Belgium, the efforts to protect Electrabel via slow liberalization ultimately failed. 
Austria was bolder to liberalize and its incumbents to internationalise, particularly focusing on the 
markets in East Europe.  
Internationalization patterns of EU incumbents in telecoms and electricity are best explained using 
comparative political economy lenses, whereby country and sectoral trends, interwoven with the firm-
level, provide a superior explanation for the outcome of market integration in these critical sectors. 
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Annex I 
Correlation techniques were used to test for the relationship between incumbent internationalization, 
liberalization and privatization, controlling for incumbent size in 1999, 2003 and 2006. Bivariate 
Pearson’s correlation coefficients were run to determine the degree of relationships among the 
predictors and incumbent internationalisation (Table A.1 tests electricity, Table A.3, 
telecommunications). 
Table A.1: Bivariate Pearson’s correlations between Electricity Incumbent Internationalisation, 
Entry Regulation, Vertical Integration, Privatization and Size (Revenues and Employees) 
1999, 2003 and 2006. 
1999  
Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration
Pearson Correlation 0.666** 0.596* -0.090 0.325 -0.030 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.005) (0.015) (0.740) (0.219) (0.911) 
Pearson Correlation  0.967** -0.469 0.205 0.137 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.067) (0.447) (0.612) 
Pearson Correlation   -0.540* 0.085 0.234 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.031) (0.753) (0.382) 
Pearson Correlation    0.173 -0.543* Entry Regulation 
 Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.523) (0.030) 
Pearson Correlation     -0.680** Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.004) 
2003  Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration
Pearson Correlation 0.049 0.057 0.317 0.191 -0.004 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.852) (0.829) (0.215) (0.463) (0.986) 
Pearson Correlation  0.895** -0.418 0.132 0.381 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.095) (0.614) (0.132) 
Pearson Correlation   -0.287 -0.038 0.515* Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.264) (0.884) (0.035) 
Pearson Correlation    -0.152 -0.106 Entry Regulation 
 Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.560) (0.685) 
Pearson Correlation     -0.352 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.165) 
2006  Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration
Pearson Correlation 0.068 0.097 0.030 -0.100 0.333 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.796) (0.710) (0.908) (0.702) (0.192) 
Pearson Correlation  0.888** -0.025 0.209 0.417 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.923) (0.420) (0.096) 
Pearson Correlation   -0.030 -0.019 0.397 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.910) (0.943) (0.115) 
Pearson Correlation    -0.060 -0.269 Entry Regulation 
 Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.820) (0.296) 
Pearson Correlation     0.061 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.818) 
Notes:  N=16.  * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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We also conducted Kendall rank correlation (a non-parametric test) and Spearman rank correlation (a 
non-parametric test to measure the degree of association between variables). In general, Kendall and 
Spearman correlations show similar results, so, only Kendall correlations are shown (Table A.2 for 
electricity, Table A.4 for telecommunications). 
Table A.2: Kendall correlations for Electricity Incumbent Internationalisation, Market Entry, 
Privatisation, Vertical Integration and size of the firms (Revenues and Employees). 
1999  
Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration
Correlation Coefficient 0.314 0.461* -0.081 0.203 -0.049 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.108) (0.018) (0.697) (0.330) (0.825) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.750** -0.303 0.156 0.000 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.125) (0.429) (1,000) 
Correlation Coefficient   -0.284 0.138 0.022 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.149) (0.485) (0.916) 
Correlation Coefficient    0.152 -0.573* Entry Regulation 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.472) (0.011) 
Correlation Coefficient     -0.609** Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.007) 
2003  
Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration
Correlation Coefficient 0.044 0.148 0.236 0.236 0.000 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.804) (0.409) (0.241) (0.218) (1,000) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.691** -0.479* 0.218 0.145 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed) . (0.000) (0.017) (0.252) (0.481) 
Correlation Coefficient   -0.440* 0.218 0.241 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.028) (0.252) (0.240) 
Correlation Coefficient    -0.172 -0.282 Entry Regulation 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.423) (0.224) 
Correlation Coefficient     -0.254 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.248) 
2006  
Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Vertical Integration
Correlation Coefficient 0.097 0.097 0.132 0.025 0.319 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.591) (0.591) (0.529) (0.898) (0.134) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.779** -0.336 0.234 0.364 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.103) (0.219) (0.083) 
Correlation Coefficient   -0.259 0.234 0.283 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.210) (0.219) (0.178) 
Correlation Coefficient    0.128 -0.195 Entry Regulation 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.563) (0.426) 
Correlation Coefficient     0.067 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.767) 
Notes: N=16, * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table A.3: Bivariate Pearson’s correlations between Telecoms Incumbent Internationalisation, 
Entry Regulation, Market Structure, Privatization and Size (Revenues and Employees) 
1999, 2003 and 2006. 
1999  Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Pearson Correlation 0.073 0.151 0.264 0.479 0.184 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.812) (0.623) (0.383) (0.097) (0.547) 
Pearson Correlation  0.958** 0.404 0.383 0.587* Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) (0.171) (0.196) (0.035) 
Pearson Correlation   0.361 0.263 0.492 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.226) (0.386) (0.088) 
Pearson Correlation    -0.106 0.459 Entry Regulation 
 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.730) (0.115) 
Pearson Correlation     0.386 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.193) 
2003  Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Pearson Correlation 0.112 0.186 .a -0.236 -0.230 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.715) (0.542) . (0.437) (0.449) 
Pearson Correlation  0.977** .a 0.009 0.170 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) . (0.977) (0.580) 
Pearson Correlation   .a -0.023 0.100 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.939) (0.746) 
Pearson Correlation    .a .a Entry Regulation 
 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Pearson Correlation     0.067 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.827) 
2006  Revenues  Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Pearson Correlation 0.292 0.338 .a -0.112 -0.188 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.333) (0.258) . (0.716) (0.538) 
Pearson Correlation  0.985** .a 0.091 0.154 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) . (0.768) (0.616) 
Pearson Correlation   .a 0.086 0.130 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.780) (0.671) 
Pearson Correlation    .a .a Entry Regulation 
 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Pearson Correlation     0.047 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.879) 
Notes: N=12. * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-tailed). 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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Table A.4: Kendall correlations among Telecom Incumbent Internationalisation, Entry 
Regulation, Privatisation, Market Structure and Size (Revenues and Employees).  
1999  Revenues Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Correlation Coefficient 0.000 0.105 0.273 0.040 0.184 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (1.000) (0.622) (0.274) (0.853) (0.389) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.718** 0.531* 0.248 0.538* Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.001) (0.030) (0.243) (0.010) 
Correlation Coefficient   0.435 0.092 0.410 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   (0.076) (0.667) (0.051) 
Correlation Coefficient    -0.098 0.483* Entry Regulation 
Sig. (2-tailed)    (0.691) (0.048) 
Correlation Coefficient     0.275 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (0.197) 
2003  Revenues Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Correlation Coefficient 0.144 0.170 .a -0.122 -0.177 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.500) (0.425) . (0.575) (0.419) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.821** .a 0.160 0.107 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) . (0.457) (0.621) 
Correlation Coefficient   .a 0.294 0.053 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.172) (0.805) 
Correlation Coefficient    .a .a Entry Regulation 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Correlation Coefficient     0.000 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (1.000) 
2006  Revenues Employees Entry Regulation Privatization Market Structure 
Correlation Coefficient 0.234 0.260 .a -0.135 -0.130 Internationalization 
Sig. (2-tailed) (0.270) (0.221) . (0.534) (0.540) 
Correlation Coefficient  0.821** .a 0.187 0.026 Revenues  
Sig. (2-tailed)  (0.000) . (0.385) (0.903) 
Correlation Coefficient   .a 0.187 0.000 Employees 
Sig. (2-tailed)   . (0.385) (1.000) 
Correlation Coefficient    .a .a Entry Regulation 
Sig. (2-tailed)    . . 
Correlation Coefficient     0.000 Privatization 
Sig. (2-tailed)     (1.000) 
Notes: N=12, * Correlation is significant at the *p<0.05 level (2-tailed). ** Correlation is significant at the **p<0.01 level (2-tailed). 
a. Cannot be computed because at least one of the variables is constant. 
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